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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how quantity competition operates in economies in which a 
network describes the set of feasible trades. A general equilibrium model is 
presented in which prices and .ows of goods are endogenously determined. In 
such economies equilibrium dictates whether an individual buys, sells or does both 
(which is possible). The first part of the analysis provides sufficient conditions for 
pure strategy equilibrium existence; characterizes equilibrium prices, flows and 
markups; and details negative effects on welfare of changes in the network 
structure. The main contributions show that goods do not cycle, since prices strictly 
increase along the supply chains; that not all connected players with different 
marginal rates of substitution trade; and that adding trading relationships may 
decrease individual and social welfare. The second part of the analysis provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a networked economy to become 
competitive as the number of players grows large. In this context it shown that no 
economy in which goods are resold can ever be competitive; and that large well 
connected economies are competitive. 
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1 Introduction
Classical models of competition rely on the anonymity of markets to explain trade and
prices in an economy. In such view all exchanges take place in a centralized market and
the identity of players has no e¤ect on the prices and on the terms of trade. In recent
years di¤erent models of competition have been proposed to study economies in which all
exchanges take place in decentralized bilateral relationships. Prices and terms of trade in
such economies depend on the limitations to the set of feasible exchanges (which are usually
expressed as network). Most results have been developed for economies in which the set
of buyers and the set of sellers are exogenously determined and in which only trades from
sellers to buyers are feasible. The purpose of this study is: (1) to understand how networked
markets operate if equilibrium determines who buys, who sells and who does both; and (2)
to provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the fundamentals of such decentralized
markets for an economy to be perfectly competitive.
The paper presents a general equilibrium trade model for economies in which a net-
work describes the set of feasible trading relationships among individuals. In the model
proposed every individual owns an exchange location and selshly routes scarce resources
to his neighbors, knowing how prices are determined at each location. Individuals in the
economy simultaneously decide how many goods to sell to their neighbors (i.e. outow
competition). As in a Cournot model, prices at each location guarantee that all good sup-
plied to a location are purchased. Changes in sales distort both the price at which units
are purchased and the prices at which units are sold, as trade distorts the marginal rates
of substitution of both players involved in a transaction. Traders account for such price
distortions and selshly choose how much to sell to their neighbors on the network in order
to maximize their well being. Equilibrium ows of goods endogenously determine whether
an individual buys, sells or does both, based on preferences, production possibilities and the
position held in the network. Supply chains arise endogenously in equilibrium. Intermedia-
tion and signicant price dispersion are persistent phenomena in small or poorly connected
economies.
The rst part of the analysis provides su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium; characterizes equilibrium prices, ows and markups; and details neg-
ative e¤ects on welfare of changes in the network structure. The main contributions of this
part of the analysis show that goods do not cycle, since prices strictly increase along the
supply chains; that not all connected players with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution
trade; and that adding trading relationships may have negative consequences on individual
and social welfare.
In the outow competition model individuals who both buy and sell goods (i.e. resell
goods) do so at strictly positive markups, as the ownership of trading locations leads to
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positive price distortions. Selsh behavior results in price discrimination across individuals
at di¤erent positions in the trading network. Resale is pervasive and relies both on the
scarcity of trading partners and on di¤erent prices that reign throughout the economy in
equilibrium. Two observations follow directly from the strictly positive retail markups: (i)
goods do not cycle and (ii) not all linked players with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution
trade. No individual would ever purchase units he sold, because a higher price would have
to be paid. Moreover individuals with lower willingness to pay for a good may prefer not to
sell goods to players with a higher willingness to pay, since trade would increase the price
paid for the units purchased. This implication di¤ers from that of the Cournot model in
which any two players with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution always elect to trade.
The nal results characterizing ows details the e¤ects on welfare of changes in the network
structure. In this context is possible to show that adding trading relationships does not
necessarily improve the social welfare. In fact when new links are added, more goods may
ow to low value markets as sellers try to elicit higher prices in the markets in which the
goods are most desired. More surprisingly the study shows that increasing the set of trading
partners of an individual may decrease his own welfare even if he is given the option not to
trade on newly created links. Indeed whenever trades on a new link raise the demand of
an individual, price discrimination by his suppliers may decrease both the amount of goods
sold to him and his individual welfare.
The second part of the analysis provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a net-
worked economy to become competitive as the number of players in the economy grows
large. The main contributions of this part show that no economy in which one or more indi-
viduals both buy and sell goods can ever be competitive independently of the size and of the
structure of the market; and that large well connected economies are always competitive.
In this setup a networked economy becomes competitive only if all trades become di-
rect and individuals either buy or sell goods. The necessity of such condition relies on
the strictly positive markups that intermediaries command whenever they are required to
distribute goods. Thus in the outow model competition among those who resell goods
can undermine, but not eliminate resale markups if intermediaries are required to supply
goods. Su¢ cient conditions on the network structure are also provided to guarantee that an
economy becomes competitive as the number of players grows large. Such conditions require
any group of individuals purchasing goods in a competitive equilibrium to face a positive
excess supply from the players which are linked to them on the network and which sell goods
in the competitive equilibrium. If such condition holds and if all players have su¢ ciently
many suppliers in the economy, all trades become direct and equilibrium markups vanish.
Limiting economies can be fully characterized even when they do not become competitive.
In such instances retail can persists even with innitely many producers, intermediaries and
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consumers. Even though equilibrium markups and gross margins decrease as an economy
grows large, they do not disappear for intermediaries of any limiting economy as individuals
become price takers as suppliers, but not as buyers. When all local markets become more
competitive, social welfare increases and is bounded above by its limiting value. As in most
quantity competition models su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence can be relaxed
when an economy grows large.
The nal part of the analysis presents an alternative quantity competition model in
which individuals to decide how much to buy (i.e. inow competition). Similar results hold,
even though the distribution rents di¤ers. More rents ow to buyers and social welfare
is generally higher than when players choose how much to sell. Again equilibria are not
competitive in economies that are small or with signicant intermediation, because of the
price distortions inherent to the model.
Literature Review: A recent literature has been devoted to the analysis of trade in
buyer-seller networks. In such models the set of buyers and the set seller in an economy
are exogenously determined and the network describes which sellers can supply any given
buyer in the economy. Several papers discuss such setup, but di¤er in the way compe-
tition proceeds on the network. Kranton and Minehart 2001 [13] model the competition
among suppliers, by having them hold simultaneous ascending price auctions. Their pa-
per shows that link patterns which lead to e¢ cient outcomes are equilibria of a network
formation game. Corominas-Bosch 2004 [6] models trade on each link as resulting from a
non-cooperative bargaining game. Her analysis provides su¢ cient conditions on the net-
work structure for the equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the Walrasian
outcome. Blume, Easley, Kleinberg and Tardos 2007 [3] study a buyer-seller networks in
which all trades are mediated by middlemen. In their model since middlemen can make
take it or leave it o¤ers to both sides of the market, they capture all the surplus and imple-
ment the e¢ cient allocation. Lever [15] discusses Bertrand competition between duopolists
on buyer seller networks. Therein he shows that with such model of competition social
welfare always increases with the connectedness of the network and that fully connected
networks are perfectly competitive. In all the models discussed, however, the position that
individuals hold on the network exogenously determines whether they buy, sell or retail.
The quantity competition model presented here di¤ers from the basic setup of this litera-
ture, because equilibrium dictates which roles individuals have on the supply chains. Other
papers have been concerned with the study of trade in more general networked market.
Kakade, Kerns and Orthiz [11] study the competitive equilibria of a networked market. As
in quantity competition model proposed ows of goods in such economies are endogenous.
However, the advantages of more general network structures are tempered by the assump-
tion that all individuals are price takers. Finally a related literature takes sources and sinks
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of the ows as exogenously determined and studies how the owners of the links should price
ows if individuals selshly rout those ows on a network. Such literature usually takes a
Bertrand approach to model competition and was developed to study how internet providers
price stream of information if individuals selshly rout their ows. Two examples of it are:
Chawla and Roughgarden 2007 [7] which studies competition with capacity constraints; and
Acemouglu and Ozdaglar 2007 [2] which studies competition in parallel-serial networks.
Roadmap: Section 2 is devoted to the outow competition model. It presents: the basic
setup (section 2.1), the outow competition model (section 2.2), some examples (section
2.3) and su¢ cient conditions for pure strategy equilibrium existence (section 2.4). The
analysis proceeds with the characterization of equilibrium prices and ows (section 2.5) and
of the welfare e¤ects of changes in the network structure (section 2.6). Section 3 discusses
outow competition in large economies and provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
a competitive equilibrium to emerge. Section 4 presents the inow competition model. All
proofs can be found in appendix.
2 Outow Competition in Networked Markets
2.1 Basic Setup and Constrained E¢ ciency
A networked market is one in which not all trades among individuals are feasible. An
economy in this setup consists of: a set of individuals, an undirected graph describing
what trades are feasible, endowments and payo¤s for each individual. If an undirected
graph G = (V;E) describes the set of feasible exchanges, the set of vertices of such graph V
consists of all the individuals in the economy, while the set of edges of the graph E describes
which trades are feasible. Therefore, agent i and agent j can trade if and only if ij 2 E.
Assuming the graph to be undirected requires j to be able to supply to i, whenever i can
supply to j. The set of neighbors of player i consists of all those individuals who are linked
to i and is denoted by:
Vi = fj 2 V j ij 2 Eg
Initially let there be two goods in the economy. For convenience call them consumption
q and money m. Each individual in the economy is endowed with a nite amount of the
consumption good, call it Qi for player i, and with a large amount of money. Assume that
the payo¤ of each player is separable in the two goods and linear in money:
ui(q) +m
Moreover assume that payo¤s on consumption satisfy:
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Assumption A1 For any player i 2 V assume that ui is three times continuously di¤er-
entiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave on R.
When the assumptions in A1 hold only on R+, assumption A1+ is said to hold. Otherwise,
payo¤s are dened also on short trading positions, because deviations from suppliers may
leave intermediaries on the network with negative consumption holdings. Such payo¤s can
be interpreted assuming that players have preferences on consumption dened by a map vi
and can produce those goods through cost function i. If so ui denotes the net payo¤ on
after-trade positions and satises:
ui(q) = argmaxy2R+ vi(q + y)  i(y) s.t. q + y  0
An alternative interpretation abstracts from production to focus on pure exchange economies,
but requires players to hold positive amounts of consumption after trade. In such view, pay-
o¤s on short positions are punishments for default. The di¤erentiability assumption on R 
is easily relaxed, but di¤erent assumptions on the consequences of short positions would
have to be invoked.
Denote by qij the ow of consumption good from individual i to individual j. Bold
letters are used to denote vectors of ows. Thus qi denotes the vector of outows from i
to his neighbors in Vi; q denotes the Cartesian product of all the qis and q i denotes the
Cartesian product of qj for all j 6= i. Since trades can occur only amongst consumers that
know each other, qij = 0 whenever ji =2 E. The price of the ow qij is denoted by pij. In this
setup after trade consumption of player i is dened by:
qi = Qi +
P
k2Vi [q
k
i   qik]
In a model without production, three di¤erent assumptions on credit may be invoked to
guarantee that trades be feasible. We refer to the rst assumption as full-credit (F), to the
second as limited-credit (L) and to the latter as no-credit (N). Such assumptions bound the
set of feasible outows from player i, respectively, to:
XFi (q
 i) =

qi 2 RVi+
 qi  0	 (F)
XLi (q
 i) =

qi 2 RVi+
 qi  maxk2Vi qki  0	 (L)
XNi (q
 i) =

qi 2 RVi+
Qi  Pk2Vi qik  0	 (N)
In the full-credit model individuals can sell all the units they own or purchase. In the
limited-credit model, individuals must hold some reserves to make sure that no unilateral
deviation leads to default. While in the no-credit model no short sales are allowed in
equilibrium. In an economy with production and without capacity constraints, none of this
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assumptions will need to be invoked. Non-negativity constraints on monetary holdings will
be neglected throughout. It is implicitly assumed that money endowments are large enough
for such constraints never to bind. Since utility is linear in money, such assumption implies
that the monetary endowments will not a¤ect decisions. Omitting such endowments, the
welfare of individual i consists of his utility from consumption and of the gains from trade.
In particular, given ows q 2 RE+ and prices p 2 RE+ it is equal to:
ui(qi) +
P
k2Vi [p
i
kq
i
k   pki qki ]
A player resells whenever he buys and sells a positive amount of goods. Individual is resale,
ri, consists of the total amount of goods that are bought to be sold by i:
ri = min
P
k2Vi q
k
i ;
P
k2Vi q
i
k
	
A prole of ows q 2 RE+ said to be constrained e¢ cient if it maximizes the sum of
individualswelfare given set of feasible transfers. Because of quasi-linearity the equal Pareto
weights assumption will select the feasible allocation that maximizes of the monetary value
of the economy. For instance, in a model with no production and with full-credit constrained
e¢ cient ows solves:
q 2 argmaxq2RE+
P
i2V ui(qi) s.t. qi  0 for 8i 2 V
If the solution to this problem lies in the interior of the domain, the constrain e¢ cient
allocation equalizes the marginal rates of substitution of any two consumers i and j that
belong to the same component of the networked economy G.1 If, instead, no feasible prole
of ows equalizes marginal rates of substitution across individuals belonging to the same
component, feasibility constraints on ows limit the extent of feasible redistribution and
pin down the allocation. If the networked economy is connected and credit is full, any
constrained e¢ cient allocation is also e¢ cient, since goods can be routed to all locations.
But if the economy is not connected redistribution can only equalize marginal rates of
substitution within components of the graph, but not across components. Constrained
e¢ ciency always pins down an allocation. It does not, however, pin down ows of goods in
the economy, unless further assumptions are invoked.
2.2 Outow Competition
In the outow competition model the fundamentals of the economy (network, preferences
and endowments) are common knowledge among players. Every individual purchasing con-
1Any maximal connected subgraph of G is a component of G. See [4].
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sumption owns a trading location to which all his neighbors can ship goods to, so long as
they satisfy the relevant credit constraints. In particular, competition proceeds as follows:
initially individuals simultaneously decide how much consumption to ship each neighbor;
then given the chosen ows market prices are determined at each location so that all units
supplied are sold. Suppliers expect such prices when choosing their shipments. Buyers pay
all of their inows equally at the marginal value of the last unit purchased, which is the
marginal value of the last unit consumed. Thus prices are determined by inverse demand
curve with respect to quantity at each node. In particular for ij 2 E:
pji (q) = pi(qi) = u
0
i(qi) = u
0
i(Qi +
P
k2Vi [q
k
i   qik]) (1)
Such prices arise because, given the number of units for sale at each node, no higher price
would clear the market. The concavity of the utility map requires that @pi(qi)=@q
j
i < 0
and @pi(qi)=@qij > 0 for any j 2 Vi. The price paid by consumer i decreases when inows
increase and increases when outows increase. Thus increasing the amount of goods supplied
to a neighbor leads both to an increase in the price paid for all units purchased and to a
decrease in the price received for all units sold to that neighbor. Changes in other ows on
the network do not a¤ect directly the price paid by i.
The pricing equation implicitly assumes that suppliers can pre-commit to deliver ows
of consumption to known buyers. Indeed if suppliers had such ability and were to compete
locally on prices, equation 1 would still dictate pricing, since no supplier could benet from
a unilateral deviation in prices o¤ered. Price reductions would not a¤ect the quantity sold,
while price increases would reduce revenues because of falling sales. This observation was
rst made by Kreps and Sheinkman while studying Bertrand competition with quantity
pre-commitment in [14].2 The implied pricing favors suppliers in each local market, because
the demand curve is used to clear markets. Section 4 explores the consequences of the
alternative setup in which suppliers own the trading location and buyers pre-commit to
inows bought.
Suppliers account for the e¤ects that their ows have both on the prices they receive
for each unit supplied and on the price they pay for each unit purchased. The problem of
supplier i 2 V is to choose which quantities to supply to each of his neighbors given price
e¤ects on inows and outows subject to the relevant credit constraint c 2 fF;L;Ng:
maxqi2Xci (q i) ui(qi) +
P
k2Vi

pk(qk)q
i
k   pi(qi)qki

When the credit constraint of player i 2 V does not bind, the rst order condition for a
2A forthcoming note expands their considerations to this setup.
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ow qij in the networked economy requires that:
pj(qj)  u0i(qi) +
@pj(qj)
@qij
qij  
@pi(qi)
@qij
P
k2Vi q
k
i  0
Such condition holds with equality whenever a positive quantity is supplied from i to j.
It states that the marginal benet of selling an additional unit, the price, must o¤set the
marginal cost of forgone consumption, the marginal decrease of the price of that outow
and the marginal increase of the prices of all inows. The rst wedge is due to the fact that
i is a Cournot supplier of j. While the second wedge is due to the fact i is a monopsonistic
buyer at his location.
A necessary condition for trade from i to j to occur is that price player i receives
for selling an additional unit to j exceeds the marginal benet of consuming that unit:
pj(qj) > u
0
i(qi). In the outow model, as argued later in detail, such condition is not
su¢ cient for trade to take place. Price distortions curtail the supply of consumption good
to each local market. The worst possible use of goods owned is thus consumption and not
trade. Hence, when clearing each local market, no buyer would be willing to pay more than
such benet on the last unit purchased. Pricing equation 1 implies that the marginal benet
of the last unit consumed is exactly the price each buyer pays for his inows.
For claritys sake let the individual welfare that player i derives from a prole of ows q
be dened by:
wi(q) = ui(qi) +
P
k2Vi

u0k(qk)q
i
k   u0i(qi)qki

In what follows the expression outow equilibrium will be used to refer to a pure strategy
Nash equilibria of the outow competition model. For any of the three credit constraints
c 2 fF;L;Ng:
Outow Equilibrium Flows q 2 RE+ constitute an outow equilibrium with c-credit if for
8i 2 V :
qi 2 argmaxqi2Xci (q i)wi(qi;q i)
2.3 A Four Player Example
Consider an economy with four players, labeled fa; b; c; dg. Let player a be endowed with
three units of consumption, b be endowed with one unit, while the remaining two players,
c and d, with none. For all players preferences for consumption satisfy ui(q) = q1=2. Con-
strained e¢ ciency requires all consumers to split consumption good equally when the trade
network is connected. Social welfare at such allocation is maximal and equal to 4. Equal
sharing, however, will not occur in equilibrium if individuals compete on outows, even
when all trades are feasible.
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If the economy is fully connected, in the unique outow equilibrium player a sells to
all his neighbors, player b resells some of the goods bought from a to c and d. Players c
and d do not trade among themselves since they are identical and in a symmetric position.3
Equilibrium ows do not equalize marginal rates of substitutions across individuals. The
price paid by consumers c and d for each unit of consumption purchased is 0:63. Such price
is higher than the price charged by consumer a to b on the units he purchases from him, 0:47.
Even though a has the option to sell directly and at a higher price to the nal consumers,
c and d, all the units that b resells to them, it is in his best interest to forgo such prots.
Indeed he prefers to do so, because he cannot curb the competition from b to supply of the
nal consumers as deviations on his part would not a¤ect the the sales from b to them.
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Figure 1: The four economies discussed are plotted. In each network: on the vertices are
endowments and identities and on the edges are equilibrium ows and their direction.
Equilibrium ows for this economy are reported in rst network of gure 1, consumption,
purchasing prices and welfare can be found in the rst matrix of table 1. In the outow
equilibrium consumers a and b restrict their supply to c and d in order to maximize their
gains from trade. The allocation is ine¢ cient and social welfare is equal to 3:91. Player b
imposes a 34% markup on all the units he resells. Therefore equilibrium resale at positive
prot margins is possible even when resale can be prevented through direct sales.
It could be conjectured that severing the link between consumers a and b, would favor
a by giving the opportunity to commit not to sell to b. However, this is not the case.
When such link is severed consumption of every player, but for player b, increases. The
nal consumers, c and d, receive more consumption good at a lower price and are better o¤.
But, consumers a and b are worse o¤, because direct competition reduces their rents. The
equilibrium is still ine¢ cient. Social welfare decreases further to 3:87. A unique price is paid
for each unit of consumption purchased by c and d, namely 0:62. This price coincides with
the Cournot equilibrium price for the economy without network. Flows for this economy
are reported in second network of gure 1, consumption, prices and welfare can be found in
the second matrix of table 1.
3If the link cd were removed from the trade network, equilibrium ows and prices would not be a¤ected,
since no trade takes place between c and d in the fully connected economy.
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E1 p q w E2 p q w E3 p q w E4 p q w
a - 1.64 2.08 a - 1.92 2.05 a - 1.95 2.08 a - 2.36 1.92
b 0.47 1.12 1.05 b - 0.78 1.02 b - 0.86 1.01 b - 0.86 1.01
c 0.63 0.62 0.39 c 0.62 0.65 0.40 c 0.60 0.70 0.42 c 0.59 0.71 0.51
d 0.63 0.62 0.39 d 0.62 0.65 0.40 d 0.72 0.49 0.35 d 1.85 0.07 0.13
+ - 4.00 3.91 + - 4.00 3.87 + - 4.00 3.86 + - 4.00 3.57
Table 1: The four matrices report equilibrium prices paid, consumption and welfare for
each player and society in each of the four economies.
If link between consumers b and d is further removed from the relationship network, con-
sumer d remains with only a and c as potential suppliers, while player c can still purchase
from both a and b. In equilibrium consumers a and b still supply all their neighbors. But,
even though consumer c ends up with signicantly more consumption good than d, he
prefers not to resell anything to d in equilibrium. Indeed, because selling to player d would
raise the price paid by c for all units purchased, player c prefers to forgo the revenues he
could make from the sale. In these markets it is quite common for connected players with
di¤erent marginal rates of substitution to prefer not to trade, because a commitment not
to resell may signicantly reduce the price of the goods purchased. The equilibrium for this
economy is characterized in the third network of gure 1 and in the third matrix of table
1. Since player c has two suppliers, while player d has only one that is active, the price c
pays for each unit bought is lower than the price paid by d. Competition amongst suppliers
reduces prices and increases the quantity supplied. Player a sells more consumption to the
competitive market than to the one in which he is a monopolist. Social welfare in this
economy is lower than in the previous two examples at 3:86.
Finally consider the economy in which individuals a, b and d only know player c. In such
a market players a and b sell to c, who with the units purchased supplies d. The equilibrium
for this economy is characterized in the fourth network of gure 1 and in the fourth matrix
of table 1. Player cs markup on the units the resells to d is of 210%. Resale occurs despite
such markup, because c has access to all suppliers. The amount of resale is constrained by
the e¤ects that such a trade bears on the prices paid by player c to his suppliers. Social
welfare drops signicantly to 3:57. Consumers a and d are negatively a¤ected by the change
from the previous environment. Consumer c gains from the previous situation, because he
gets monopoly on d and because all the supply in the market is directed towards him.
11
Flow Competition in Networked Markets Nava
2.4 Outow Equilibrium Existence
This section presents su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an outow equilibrium under
di¤erent credit assumptions. For convenience, refer to the expressions:
Ci(q
i;q i) =  ui(qi) + u0i(qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i
Rij(q
i
j;q
 i) = u0j(qj)q
i
j
respectively, as player is cost of suppling outows and as player is revenue from suppling
units to market j 2 Vi. Thus, the welfare of an individual is given by the revenues he
makes in each market that he supplies minus the costs of supplying such outows. Also,
dene the elasticity of the inverse demand curve with respect to quantity of player i by
i(q) =  qu00i (q)=u0i(q).
The proposed proof of existence imposes enough restrictions on the payo¤s of each
individual to guarantee that best reply maps are singe-valued. First notice that either of
the three credit assumptions c 2 fF;L;Ng requires the set of feasible outows Xci (q i) to
be a continuous correspondence with non-empty, compact and convex image sets for every
player i 2 V .
In economies without credit the conditions imposed on the problem require payo¤s to be
a strictly concave function of the transfers that a player makes, given the vector of transfers
made by all others. Since forbidding credit guarantees that no deviation by the suppliers can
leave a buyer in a short position, the su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence of this
model need to discipline payo¤s only on the positive orthant.4 In particular the following
conditions require: costs of supplying outows to be strictly increasing and convex; revenues
in each market to be concave; and therefore equilibrium existence.
Theorem 1 If assumption A1+ holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R+:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ 1; 2] (AN)
then an outow equilibrium exists in the no-credit model.
The bounds on the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve with respect to
quantity imposed by AN discipline both costs and revenues in any market. In particular,
the upperbound requires revenues to be concave in market i. While the lowerbound on
the elasticity requires costs to be convex. Since such conditions together with assumption
A1+ guarantee that best reply maps are continuous and single-valued, Brouwers xed point
theorem grants the existence of an outow equilibrium.
4With NC qi  
P
k2Vi q
k
i  0 for any i 2 V .
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In economies with limited-credit the conditions imposed on the problem require payo¤s
to be a strictly concave function of the transfers that a player makes, whenever payo¤s
are increasing in those transfers. Since limiting credit also guarantees that no unilateral
deviation by a single supplier can leave a buyer in a short position, su¢ cient conditions
for equilibrium existence will discipline payo¤s only on the positive orthant.5 In particular
the following conditions require: revenues in each market to be concave; costs of supplying
outows to be convex whenever revenues of supplying that market are increasing; and
therefore equilibrium existence.6
Theorem 2 If assumption A1+ holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R+:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ i(q)=Vi; 2] (AL)
then an outow equilibrium exists both in the limited-credit and no-credit model.
Assumption AL imposes a di¤erent lowerbound on the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand curve with respect to quantity to guarantee that costs are convex whenever the
revenues from selling to that market are increasing for any supplier. Since such conditions
require payo¤s for all players to be strictly concave whenever increasing, it follows that best
reply functions are continuous and single-valued and Brouwers xed point theorem grants
the existence of an outow equilibrium.
In the full-credit model tighter conditions need to be imposed to make sure that no
supplier benets from unilateral deviations that can leave his buyers in short positions.
Moreover payo¤s need to be dened and disciplined also on short consumption positions
when such transfers are feasible. The assumptions invoked will require one of the following
two conditions to hold: (i) costs are convex and revenues are concave whenever increasing;
or (ii) revenues are concave and costs are convex whenever revenues increase in that market.
In particular the following assumption when coupled with A1, guarantees that either (i) or
(ii) holds:
Theorem 3 If assumption A1 holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ i(q)=Vi; 2i(q)] (AF)
then an outow equilibrium exists in anyone of the three credit models.
Assumption AF requires the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve with respect
to quantity to be bounded: below by  1=Vi times the elasticity of the inverse demand
5With LC qi   qki  0 for any k 2 Vi.
6That is @Rji (q
j
i ;q
 j)=@qji  0 implies @2Ci(qi;q i)=(@qi)2  0.
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curve and above by 2 times the elasticity of the inverse demand curve. Such condition
also guarantees that best reply maps are continuous and single-valued and that Brouwers
xed point theorem applies. Even though assumptions for equilibrium existence in the
full-credit model discipline payo¤s also on short consumption positions, such conditions
can be relaxed on the negative orthant, if one assumes that players with negative after
trade positions default and su¤er a punishment that does not depend on their trading
position. A forthcoming note discusses the issue in detail and provides su¢ cient conditions
for equilibrium existence when such assumptions are invoked.
It can be readily veried that common families of preferences meet the proposed condi-
tions for outow equilibrium existence:
Corollary 4 If ui(q) = iqi + "i for i 2 (0; 1), i 2 R++, "i 2 R and any i 2 V , then an
outow equilibrium exists in economies with none or limited credit.
Corollary 5 If ui(q) =  ie iq + "i for i 2 R++, i 2 R++, "i 2 R and any i 2 V , then
an outow equilibrium exists in anyone of the three credit models.
Su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness in economies with four or fewer players have been found.
It is conjectured that such conditions are valid even in economies with more than four player.
2.5 Basic Properties of Outow Equilibria
This section presents results about equilibrium ow patterns and markups in economies with
a nite number of players. Recall that, as argued in section 2.3, the following condition is
necessary for consumption to be sold from individual i to j:
u0j(qj) = pj(qj) > u
0
i(qi) (2)
An immediate implication of condition 2 is that consumption ows only in one direction
on every link, since condition 2 and the reverse inequality cannot hold at once. Thus at
most jEj =2 ows are positive in equilibrium. In contrast to the Cournot model condition
2 is not su¢ cient for a trade from i to j to take place. In the outow model individuals
purchasing goods sell to their neighbors only if the gains from trade can compensate them
for the monopsony price distortion on their inows. Equilibrium retail markups are positive
because player i purchasing consumption and qij > 0 together imply:
pj(qj)  pi(qi) =  u00j (qj)qij   u00i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i >  u00i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i > 0
Thus buyers and intermediaries with similar marginal rates of substitution usually refrain
from trading even if linked (as in the third example of section 2.3). Resale is pervasive in
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these economies and has two motives. The more immediate motive is that trading networks
have a limited number of links that can be used to transfer goods. The second motive is
that sellers have incentives to price discriminate buyers by selling to all individuals to which
they are linked at di¤erent prices, provided that they make gains on each trade. Which
explains why even fully connected economies display equilibrium resale.
For convenience dene an individual to be a source (sink) if he does not buy (sell)
consumption. The following proposition summarizes some useful properties of the outow
equilibrium ows. These properties follow directly from the optimality individual decisions:
Proposition 6 If assumption A1 holds in any outow equilibrium q 2 RE+:
(a) Goods do not cycle and prices strictly increase along the supply chains
(b) Players with marginal utility higher/lower than their neighbors are sources/sinks
(c) Sources sell to all their neighbors with strictly higher marginal utility
(d) If i; j 2 Vk and u0i(qi) < u0j(qj), then i buys from k only if j buys from k
Part (a) is a straightforward consequence of goods being resold at strictly positive markups.
In fact, because the marginal utility of consumption strictly increases along the supply
chain, it can never be that an individual buys some of the units he previously sold. Since
goods do not cycle ows of goods move from sources to sinks. A ow pattern, however,
can have more than one source and/or sink in equilibrium. Part (b) shows that individuals
with lower marginal utility than their neighbors are sources and that individuals with higher
marginal utility than their neighbors are sinks. Individuals with lower marginal utility than
all their neighbors would never buy, because only players with lower marginal utility could
supply them. Similarly individuals with higher marginal utility than their neighbors could
never sell. Part (c) shows that sources sell to every neighbor with higher marginal utility.
For sources condition 2 is not only necessary, but also su¢ cient for a trade to take place,
because sources have no inows and because outow price distortions vanish with outows.
Part (d) shows that if two players have a neighbor in common, that neighbor sells to the
low marginal utility player only if he sells to the high marginal utility player. Intuitively
because the lower marginal utility neighbor pays a lower price, he is supplied only if the
high marginal utility neighbor has been supplied rst.
If all individuals in the economy are linked and can trade with each other, the positions
in the market are symmetric. In such economies di¤erences in ows and welfare driven by
endowments and preferences. In particular di¤erences in marginal utilities dictate which of
two players sells more to all his neighbors:
Proposition 7 If assumption A1 holds and if u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj), then in any outow equilib-
rium of the complete networked economy: (1) qik  qjk and (2) qik > 0 implies qik > qjk.
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Even though such claim is intuitive it requires some discipline on inows. In particular, the
claim requires the ranking of marginal utilities to coincide with the ranking of supply costs.
The complete network structure guarantees that such discipline is maintained. Therefore low
marginal utility players sell more. However, without further assumptions it is impossible to
guarantee that players with low marginal utilities also buy less from their neighbors. Section
7.2 of the web-appendix provides su¢ cient conditions on preferences to make sure that the
latter holds in a complete network economy.
Whenever endowments are ine¢ cient, equilibrium consumption in any economy pop-
ulated by a nite number of players is ine¢ cient. In general poorly endowed consumers
tend to consume less than what would be e¢ cient and well endowed players tend overcon-
sume. Exceptions to this rule of thumb are possible for specic network and endowment
congurations, but never lead to equilibrium e¢ ciency. Occasionally well connected but
poorly endowed players reap large gains both in consumption and money through retrade.
If endowments are e¢ cient, no trade takes place and a unique price reigns throughout the
economy, namely the competitive equilibrium price.
The last result presented in this section considers what happens to this economy if
players have several instances to trade on the network. In such environment endowments at
each trading round are the nal allocation of the previous round. The current version of the
result makes use of two strong assumptions: agents do not discount and act myopically. If
such assumptions hold, it can be shown that as the number of instances in which to trade on
the network grows large outow equilibrium outcomes become constrained e¢ cient. Thus if
players have arbitrarily many instances to trade the limiting allocation of consumption will
be e¢ cient and the limiting prices will be competitive in each component of the network.
But, since prices paid for each ow di¤er along the sequence of trades the distribution of
individual welfare will not coincide with that of a Walrasian economy.
Proposition 8 If individuals do not discount and do not account for future actions, as the
number of instances in which to trade grows large the sequence of outow equilibrium trades
converges to the constrained e¢ cient outcome whenever such outcome is interior.
The result hinges on two observations. The rst is that all individuals with the lowest
equilibrium marginal utility at round t always have an incentive to sell to all their neighbors
at round t + 1. In turn this implies that the sequence of outow equilibrium allocations
converges. The second observation is that such sequence cannot converge to an allocation
that is not constrained e¢ cient, since at the limiting allocation individuals which benet
from a deviation would exist. Requiring the e¢ cient allocation to be interior guarantees
that goods do not remain stuck with suppliers which value them little and that can only sell
them to individuals which value them less. Since individuals are myopic they are willing
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to pay di¤erent prices for the same ow at di¤erent trading instances. Limiting prices are
competitive. A generalization of proposition 8 to forward looking players should account for
the fact that individuals do not want to pay di¤erent prices along the sequence of equilibria.
Such result, however, is still under investigation.
Comments on Prices, Welfare and Market Power: In the outow competition model
individuals on the network can be interpreted as a separate local markets. Competitors use
their access to di¤erent locations to price discriminate their customers. Since the outow
model prevents price discrimination within each market, discriminating across markets is
welfare maximizing for suppliers. Neighborsendowments and access to markets determines
buying prices. High equilibrium marginal utility neighbors pay more than low marginal
utility neighbors. Goods are often exchanged below the competitive equilibrium price (as
in the rst example of section 2.3). Because of price discrimination suppliers prefer having
access to more local markets. Suppliers occasionally prefer to sell goods to competitors at a
discount, even though such goods are used to compete against them to supply consumers at
higher prices. This occurs when the sales to competitors bring enough revenues to overcome
the losses due to increased competition in the high value markets. Resale is pervasive in
such economies, even fully connected economies. It is driven by the prot opportunities
that the di¤erent prices in the economy present to players. The monopsony wedge is the
main force limiting resale, because it increases the cost of supplying goods at each step.
Whenever the economys endowment is e¢ cient, no trade occurs and the competitive
equilibrium price reigns on all links. Thus, transfers of consumption good that bring econ-
omy to the competitive outcome always exist. But, no economy of nite size and with an
ine¢ cient endowment prole, can ever become e¢ cient as a result of trades in such markets.
In fact, even though goods ow to under-endowed individuals the distortions caused by the
price e¤ects cannot vanish in any nite size economy. In a networked market not only
the endowments, but also the positions held in the market determine individual welfare.
Since rents are higher in markets with fewer competitors, having access to more of such
markets benets a seller. Buyers benet from having access to more sellers since competi-
tion decreases the markup that supplier are able to charge to them. Poorly endowed, but
well connected individuals can thrive in these economies by selling at a markup most of
the units bought to low competition markets. Gains from trades are distributed along the
supply chain.
2.6 Adding Links and Welfare
This section details the e¤ects on individual and social welfare of changes in the network.
Two prototypical examples are introduced. The rst shows that adding a connection can re-
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duce social welfare, an instance of Braesss Paradox. The second, instead, shows that adding
a link may reduce the welfare of one of the two players on the newly created relationship.
Such examples motivate the study of networks that are not complete.
Braesss Paradox: Consider a market with three consumers fa; b; cg and in which indi-
vidual a is endowed with two units of consumption, b with one unit and the c with none.
Preferences of all players satisfy u(q) = q1=2. In this economy increasing the set of trading
relationships can reduce social welfare. In particular, if the trade network is increased from
facg to fac; abg, social welfare drops. If only players a and c are allowed to trade, player a
sells 0:4 units to b at a price of 0:8 and social welfare stands at 2:9. But if consumer a is
allowed to trade with b as well as c, he elects to supply both neighbors: b with 0:2 units and
c with 0:36 units at di¤erent prices. Individual as price discrimination of b and c leads to a
reduction in the amount sold to c and to the drop in social welfare to 2:89. Player a prefers
to curtail his supply to c to extract higher marginal rents, since he can recoup that loss in
revenue by selling to b. Equilibrium ows, prices and quantities for the two economies are
reported in gure 2 (left and center) and table 2 (left and center).
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Figure 2: On the vertices of a network endowments and identities and on the edges ows.
Despite the negative result about increasing trading relationships, no example has been
found in which all of the missing connections reduce social welfare. In general a trading
relationship can be found that if added to the economy increases social welfare. In the
example presented adding link bc improves social welfare and the complete network is the
welfare maximizing market structure. The ows and prices for such network are reported
in gure 2 (right) and in table 2 (right).
E1 p q w E2 p q w E3 p q w
a - 1.60 1.58 a - 1.44 1.59 1 - 1.35 1.54
b - 1.00 1.00 b 0.46 1.20 1.00 2 0.49 1.06 1.03
c 0.79 0.40 0.32 c 0.83 0.36 0.30 3 0.65 0.59 0.39
+ - 3.00 2.90 + - 3.00 2.89 + - 3.00 2.96
Table 2: Prices paid, consumption and welfare. Left facg, center fac; abg, right
fac; ab; bcg.
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Individuals Prefer Not to be Linked: It may appear that adding a link to a networked
market always improves the individual welfare of the two players being linked. When indi-
viduals compete on quantities, however, general equilibrium e¤ects can decrease the welfare
of either member of the new trading relationship. The next example presents an economy
in which adding a link reduces the welfare of the supplier on the new link.
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Figure 3: On the vertices of a network endowments and identities and on the edges ows.
Consider an economy with four players fa; b; c; dg and with endowments f2:97; 1; 0; 0:03g.
In this example when the set of feasible trades increases from fad; bcg to fad; bc; dcg, player
ds welfare decreases. If only trades in fad; bcg are feasible in the unique equilibrium of this
economy players a and b supply their respective customers as monopolies. But when the link
cd is added to the network, player d competes with b to supply c. In the unique equilibrium
consumer d is worse o¤ than when he could not sell to c, since his payo¤ decreases from
0:42 to 0:41. Even though player d chooses to supply c, having the option to sell a¤ects the
quantity sold to him from a and thus reduces his welfare. All gains from trade on the newly
created link are either kept by c or transferred to a. Player a being the monopoly supplier
of d is able to extract more rents, because of the steeper demand schedule he faces when d
resells. Flows, allocations and prices for the two economies are reported in table 3 and in
gure 3.
E1 p q w E2 p q w
a - 2.36 1.92 a - 2.38 1.93
b - 0.80 1.12 b - 0.78 1.11
c 1.12 0.20 0.22 c 1.02 0.24 0.24
d 0.63 0.64 0.42 d 0.65 0.60 0.41
+ - 4.00 3.68 + - 4.00 3.69
Table 3: Prices paid, consumption and welfare. Left fad; bcg, right fad; dc; bcg.
The two examples presented displayed the negative consequences of adding trading relation-
ships. It would be interesting to argue that despite such negative scenarios a link always
exists that, if added, does not decrease either social or individual welfare. If such conjecture
were to hold, the complete network would be welfare maximizing and pairwise stable. But
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even though the claim holds true for all simulations carried out, the proof of such result
remains an open question. Two positive results about adding connection are proven in what
follows. The rst shows that appropriately connecting copies of an economy always increases
social welfare (section 3). The second provides su¢ cient conditions on the network structure
to guarantee that equilibrium social welfare becomes e¢ cient as an economy grows large
(section 3).
3 Large Economies and the Competitive Equilibrium
This section presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network structure to guar-
antee that the outow equilibria of a networked economy become competitive as number
of players grows large. It is shown that resale must vanish for an economy to become
competitive and that social welfare increases as an economy grows large. A complete char-
acterization of ows in the limiting economy is also presented. Su¢ cient conditions for
equilibrium existence weaken as an economy grows large. For sake of clarity all results are
presented in the context of replica economies. Section 7.5 in the web-appendix shows how
results extend to arbitrary sequences of networked markets.
Competitive Equilibrium CE: The competitive equilibrium of the economy fV;Q;ug
consists of a price p 2 R+ for consumption and of an allocation q 2 RV+ such that: (1)
each players consumption is optimal given the price; (2) the market of consumption clears.
By assumption A1 a competitive equilibrium exists and is e¢ cient. For convenience, dene
the competitive equilibrium net-trade of player i by ei = Qi   qi . Let D denote the set of
individuals buying goods in the CE and let S denote the set of players selling goods in the
CE:
D = fi 2 V jei < 0g
S = fi 2 V jei > 0g
Players in D are called competitive buyers and players in S are competitive sellers. For
any group of competitive buyers T , let ST denote the set of competitive sellers that are
neighbors of at least one of them. Similarly for any group of competitive sellers T , let DT
denote the set of competitive buyers that are neighbors of at least one of them:
ST =
S
i2T Vi \ S for T  D
DT =
S
i2T Vi \D for T  S
Finally dene the CE excess supply faced by a group of buyers and the CE excess demand
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faced by a group sellers respectively by:
(T; e) =
P
i2ST ei +
P
j2T ej for T  D
(T; e) =  Pj2DT ej  Pi2T ei for T  S
The following condition on the economy is necessary and su¢ cient the existence of direct
ows from competitive sellers to competitive buyers that support the CE allocation.
Marriage ConditionMC: Economy fG;Q;ug satises MC if (T; e)  0 for any T  D.
The marriage condition requires any group of competitive buyers to face a non-negative
excess supply. A simple economy in which MC holds is one in which every competitive buyer
is linked to every competitive seller: Vi  S for any i 2 D. If so, the marriage condition
holds trivially because CE requires the market for consumption to clear, (D; e) = 0. It
can be shown that market clearing also requires MC to be equivalent to the assumption
that any group of competitive suppliers faces a non-negative excess demand. An extension
of Halls marriage theorem to this setup shows that MC is equivalent to the existence of
direct ows from competitive sellers to competitive buyers that support the CE allocation.
Lemma 9 An economy fG;Q;ug satises MC if and only if (T; e)  0 for any T  S if
and only if there exists q 2 RE+ such that:
ej +
P
i2Sj q
i
j = 0 for 8j 2 D (i)
ei  
P
j2Di q
i
j = 0 for 8i 2 S (ii)
As in Halls theorem the more surprising part of the lemma is that condition MC is not
only necessary, but also su¢ cient for the existence of competitive ows. Because condition
MC imposes discipline both on the excess supply and on the excess demand functions, ows
support a competitive equilibrium on both sides of the market.
To impose some discipline on the economy as it grows large this section makes use of a
convenient denition of replica economy.
Replica Economy: fG(z);Q(z);u(z)g is a z-replica of fG;Q;ug for some z 2 N+ if:
V (z) = fi:sji 2 V & s 2 f1; :::; zgg (R1)
E(z) = f(i:s)(j:t)jij 2 E & s; t 2 f1; :::; zgg (R2)
Qi:s(z) = Qi & ui:s(z) = ui (R3)
The rst condition states that the players belonging the z-replica are z copies of the players
in the original economy. The second condition requires any copies of two players which were
linked in the original economy to be linked. While the third condition states that all copies
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of a player have the same endowment and utility that he has. The competitive equilibrium
does not change as the economy gets replicated. E¢ cient per-capita social welfare remains
constant along any sequence of replica economies. Therefore any copy of a competitive
buyer of the original economy remains a competitive buyer in any replica and similarly for
sellers.
Consider a sequence of replica economies fG(z);Q(z);u(z)g1z=1. The rst result of the
section shows that the fraction of goods sold directly from competitive seller to competitive
buyers converges to one in any economy that becomes competitive if replicated arbitrarily
many times. Indeed resale has to vanish in competitive markets, because intermediaries
command a rent whenever they are necessary to distribute goods.
Proposition 10 If a sequence of outow equilibria of replicas converges to the competitive
equilibrium, then equilibrium resale of any individual vanishes as the economy grows large.
The proof of the claim hinges on two observations: all trades occur at one price in a
competitive economy; and no individual ever resells any positive quantity of goods at a
zero markup. In the outow model increasing the size of the economy causes individuals
to become price takers as sellers, since each local market becomes more competitive. But
individuals never become price takers as buyers since they maintain their monopsony power
when purchasing goods at their local market. Thus the wedge on inow prices cannot
disappear if resale persists.
The next theorem is central to the analysis of large economies and shows that condition
MC is both necessary and su¢ cient to guarantee that a sequence of outow equilibrium
allocations and prices to converges to competitive equilibrium as the replicas grow large.
Theorem 11 Condition MC holds in an economy if and only if a sequence of outow
equilibria of its replicas converges to the competitive equilibrium.
The proof of the theorem shows that competition among the innitely many suppliers in
each local market eliminates rents on all trades if and only if condition MC holds. If so,
outow equilibrium trades converge to the e¢ cient allocation and a unique price reigns
throughout the limiting economy. The claim views the anonymous Walrasian market place
as an approximation of a non-anonymous market in which a large number of buyers and
sellers can trade. The theorem implies that equilibrium outcomes become competitive in
any networked economy in which all competitive buyers can trade with all competitive
sellers. Any complete network economy trivially satises condition MC and therefore when
replicated converges to the competitive equilibrium. Such market structure maximizes social
welfare in the economy as the number of players grows large. Condition MC hinges on the
denitions of D and S and in turn on that of competitive equilibrium. Thus the knowledge
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of endowments and preferences is required to test condition MC whenever the network is
not complete.
Theorem 11 also implies that no economy in which condition MC fails can be competitive,
since intermediation would be necessary for the CE allocation to be attained. In the outow
model middlemen serve no purpose in large and well connected economies. Thus they play
no role in competitive economies, as they charge more for goods that can be provided directly
by sellers. Di¤erent assumptions can be envisioned for middlemen to play positive roles in a
networked market. However, if players compete on quantities and if their marginal benets
are decreasing, any complication of the model will still have to account for a force trying
to eradicate the presence of middlemen in limiting competitive economies. The proposed
denition of replica imposes more discipline on the sequence of economies than required.
Section 7.5 shows that claims 11 and 10 hold true with slight modications even for arbitrary
sequences of growing economies.
As in most quantity competition models existence is easier to proof as an economy grows
large. If one restricts attention to symmetric equilibria along the sequence of replicas, it is
possible to dene by qij = limz!1 zq
i:t
j:s(z) the amount of goods sold in the limiting economy
from an individual of type i to all individuals of type j. In any symmetric equilibrium of
the limiting economy optimality of ows requires:
u0j(qj)  u0i(qi) + u00i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i   i  0
Outow price distortions vanish in a symmetric equilibrium, because in the limit economy
innitely many individuals compete to supply each neighbor. The price e¤ects on inows,
instead, always remains positive for those individuals who both buy and sell goods in the
limit economy. However, since the outow wedges were the complicating factor in the proof
of existence stronger results can be stated for the limit economy.
Proposition 12 If assumption A1 holds and if:
(1) u000i  0, then a symmetric outow equilibrium exists in the limit economy
(2) MC holds, then a competitive outow equilibrium exist in the limit economy
(3) Vi  S for any i 2 D, then a unique outow equilibrium exist in the limit economy
In either case revenues in each local market are concave in the limiting economy. Proposition
12 shows that costs of supplying outows are convex: in (1) by the assumption on the third
derivative; in (2) and (3) since condition MC holds and requires resale to vanish in any
competitive limiting equilibrium. The stronger conditions on the market structure imposed
in (3) guarantee that all equilibria become competitive, since all competitive sellers and
buyers can directly trade.
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The last result of this section provides su¢ cient conditions for per-capita social welfare
to increase, when an economy is replicated. Since the denition of replica requires every
local market to become more competitive as the economy grows large, the result holds with
some generality.
Proposition 13 If conditions for existence are met and if in any z-replica there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium, then symmetric equilibrium per-capita social welfare increases
every time the economy is replicated.
If a unique symmetric equilibrium exists, per-capita social welfare monotonically increases
as economy grows large. Thus even an economy in which the retail sector does not van-
ish becomes more competitive, though not perfectly competitive, as it grows large. This
proposition relies on the denition of replica to establish a link between social welfare and
network structure by exploiting the nature of the Jacobian matrix of the complementarity
problem dening the equilibrium.
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Figure 4A: A 2-replica of fab; bc; acg Figure 4B: A 3-replica of fab; bcg
To conclude the discussion on large markets consider two examples of replica economies.
The two initial economies di¤er in the market structure, but have common preferences and
endowments. In both economies there are three players: player a is endowed with two units,
player b with one unit and player c with none. Call them respectively: the producer, the
intermediary and the consumer. All three players have a common utility function for con-
sumption, namely u(q) = q1=2. In the rst example, depicted in gure 4A, all players are
connected. Such economy satises condition MC and therefore if replicated arbitrarily many
times converges to the competitive equilibrium. Equilibrium consumption of all three types
of players converges to one. Consumption of producers decreases monotonically, consump-
tion of consumers increases monotonically. Intermediariesconsumption rst increases and
then drops. The price paid by those players rst declines and then converges from below
to 1=2, the CE price. The price paid by consumers, instead, monotonically decreases to
its competitive equilibrium value. Equilibrium resale vanishes in the limiting economy and
intermediaries do not trade in the limit. Per capita social welfare increases monotonically
as the equilibrium converges to the competitive outcome. Figures 5A and 5B depict the
sequences of consumption and prices of the replicas.
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Now consider the economy, depicted in gure 4B, in which the links between producers and
consumers have been removed. In such market intermediaries act as middlemen buying from
producers in order to sell to consumers. Such economy does not satisfy MC, since no direct
sale from producers to consumers is feasible. Thus no sequence of outow equilibria of its
replicas will ever converge to the competitive equilibrium. Equilibrium consumption of the
three types of players does not converge. In the limiting economy consumption of producers
converges to that of the intermediaries and exceeds that of the consumers. Consump-
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tion of producers decreases monotonically, while that of consumers increases monotonically.
The price paid by intermediaries rst grows and then declines converging to a value below
the CE price. The price paid by consumers instead monotonically decreases, but remains
signicantly above the CE price. The limiting markup made by middlemen converges to
approximately 30%. Per-capita social welfare increases monotonically as the economy grows
large, but remains ine¢ cient. Figures 6A and 6B depict the sequences of consumption and
prices of the replicas of such economy.
The outow model recognizes that the second economy cannot mimic an anonymous
Walrasian market because intermediaries are required to exchange goods. Such example
pins down the relevant prices for the two anonymous market squares that arise in the limit.
Intermediaries in such interpretation are the only players allowed to enter both market
squares and collect a rent by transferring goods between the two markets.
4 Inow Competition in Networked Markets
This section presents the inow competition model and compares it to the outow model.
A more detailed discussion and examples of it can be found in the web-appendix (sections
7.3 and 7.4).
Inow Competition: In the inow competition model every individual selling consump-
tion owns a trading location from which all his neighbors can buy goods from. Competition
proceeds as follows: initially individuals simultaneously decide how much consumption to
buy from each neighbor; then given the chosen ows market prices are determined at each
location so that demand and supply for consumption clear at that node. Buyers expect such
prices when choosing their purchases. At each location all goods are sold at the marginal
cost of the last unit sold, which is the marginal value of the last unit consumed at that
location. The inverse supply curve at the node j 2 V satises for any i 2 Vj:
pji (q) = p
j(qj) = u
0
j(qj)
Again an argument à la Kreps and Scheinkman shows that if individuals can commit to
their inows, price competition amongst buyers leads to such prices in each local market.7
By assumption A1, the price that consumer j receives for the units he sells decreases when
inows increase and increases when outows increase: @pj(qj)=@q
j
i > 0 and @p
j(qj)=@q
i
j < 0
for any i 2 Vj. Changes in other ows in the network do not a¤ect the price paid by j.
Buyers take into account the e¤ects that their choices have both on the prices received
7Individuals o¤ering a lower price are worse o¤ since part of their demand is not met. Individual o¤ering
a higher price are worse o¤ since their demand can be met at the lower price.
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for each unit sold and on the prices paid for each unit purchased. In a full-credit inow
model buyers purchases are only limited by the availability of outows at neighboring
locations. Such assumption bounds the set of feasible inows of player i to XFi (q i) =
qi 2 RVi+
 qj  0 if j 2 Vi	. Thus in the full-credit inow model individual i 2 V solves
the following problem:
maxqi2XFi (q i) ui(qi) +
P
k2Vi [p
i(qi)q
i
k   pk(qk)qki ]
In the interior of the domain optimality for the ow qji requires that:
u0i(qi)  pj(qj) 
@pj(qj)
@qji
qji +
@pi(qi)
@qji
P
k2Vi q
i
k  0
Such condition holds with equality whenever a positive quantity is purchased, qji > 0. It
states that the marginal benet of buying consumption must o¤set the price paid, monopoly
price distortion on all units sold and the Cournot distortion on the units purchased by seller
j. This equation di¤ers from the outow equation because a di¤erent set of price distortions
is considered. In the outow model the suppliers can commit outows, while in the inow
model the buyers have the option to commit to their inows. The group having such power
benets in equilibrium by appropriating most gains from trade. Since rents in the inow
model go to buyers, more goods ow to them. Thus an inow economy is in general more
e¢ cient than an outow economy, as more goods ow to individuals with higher marginal
values. In what follows the expression inow equilibrium will be used to refer to a pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the inow competition model.
Result Survey: Su¢ cient conditions for inow equilibrium existence require slightly dif-
ferent restrictions on preferences than in the outow model. In particular:
Theorem 14 If assumption A1 holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ 2i(q); i(q)] (AFI)
then an inow equilibrium exists in full credit model.
A detailed discussion of existence under di¤erent credit assumptions is reported in the web-
appendix. In the inow model sellers supply all their customers at a single price. Buyers,
however, purchase the same good from di¤erent suppliers at di¤erent prices. Again it is
in their best interest to do so given the choices of others, because price distortions would
increase their expenses if they were to concentrate their demand on a single neighboring
market. As in the outow model resale is pervasive, but connected individuals with di¤erent
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marginal rates of substitution do not necessarily trade. In this setup a su¢ cient condition
for trade to place between a seller and a buyer is that the gains from trade exceed the
outow price distortion of the buyer. Examples reported in the web-appendix show that
adding links may still reduce social welfare or the welfare of one of the two individuals being
connected. If markets are two-sided, markups in the inow model are smaller than in the
outow model, because they depend on the concavity of the most endowed player. But for
arbitrary network structures general equilibrium e¤ects prevent such claim to hold in full
generality. Thus the inow model tends to allocate goods more e¢ ciently since rents ow
to the weaker side of the market.
The results for large economies hold unchanged. Again any economy in which the retail
sector does not vanish cannot become competitive. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions on
the network structure for a competitive equilibrium to emerge as the economy grows large
coincide in the two models. As in the outow model, su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium
existence simplify when the limiting economy is competitive.
5 Conclusions
Two questions were at the heart of this study: (1) how do networked oligopolistic markets
operate? (2) what are necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network structure for such
economies to become competitive as the number of players grows large?
To tackle the rst question two general equilibrium models of quantity competition in
networked markets were introduced. In such model individuals had ownership of a trading
location and had to choose how many goods to sell to (purchase from) their neighboring
locations. Both models had similar implications on trade patterns and pricing, but had
di¤erent implications on the distribution of rents. In either model ows and prices were
endogenously determined, goods did not cycle and prices were strictly increasing along
the supply chains. Trade patterns and the distribution of rents were determined by the
network structure and by price discrimination across neighboring local markets. Even well
connected economies displayed signicant price dispersion and non-trivial trade patterns
across local markets. Since ownership of the trading location by individuals required goods
to be resold at positive markups, not all neighboring individuals with di¤erent marginal
rates of substitution would necessarily trade. Moreover, price setting behavior implied that
adding trading relationships could negatively a¤ect both social welfare and the welfare of
anyone of the two individuals on the newly created trading relationship. Such negative
scenarios, however, would disappear as an economy grew large and well connected.
To tackle the second question necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network structure
were presented for a networked economy to become competitive as the number of individuals
28
Nava Flow Competition in Networked Markets
grows large. It was shown: that no economy that required individuals to resell goods
could ever become competitive, since retail would only occur at positive markups; and
that economies would become competitive if and only if any group of players purchasing
goods were to face a positive excess supply from the competitive sellers linked to them.
As in most quantity competition models su¢ cient conditions for pure strategy equilibrium
existence simplied in large and well-connected economies.
The analysis presented suggested Walrasian markets as good approximations of large
networked markets in which su¢ ciently many sellers could compete to supply any buyer
and in which no specic individual or group of individuals was necessary to intermediate
goods in the economy.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
Outow Equilibrium Existence
Theorem 1 If assumption A1+ holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R+:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ 1; 2] (AN)
then an outow equilibrium exists in the no-credit model.
Proof. The no-credit assumption guarantees that the set of feasible outows XNi (q
 i) is a
continuous correspondence with non-empty, closed, bounded, convex, image sets for every
player i 2 V . Su¢ cient conditions for the best reply maps to be single-valued are that player
is revenues from the sales to market j 2 Vi be concave in qij, that his costs of supplying
units be convex in the vector of outows qi and that one of the two conditions be strict.
Revenues are concave in each market if for any ij 2 E:
@2Rij(q
i
j;q
 i)=(@qij)
2 = 2u00j (qj) + q
i
ju
000
j (qj)  0 (E1)
Moreover since qi is a linear function of every outow qij and since outows a¤ect costs only
though consumption qi, costs Ci(qi;q i) are a convex function of the vector qi, if Ci(qi;q i)
is convex in qi. Therefore costs are convex in the vector of outows qi if:
@2Ci(q
i;q i)=(@qi)2 =  u00i (qi) + u000i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i  0 (E2)
Assumptions A1+ and AN imply that E1 and E2 hold, with at least one of the two holding
strictly. In particular since in the no-credit model qi   qji  0, A1+ and the upperbound in
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AN imply that revenues are concave since:
2u00j (qj) + q
i
ju
000
j (qj)  (2u00j (qj) + qju000j (qj))I(u000j (qj) > 0)  0
where I() denotes the indicator function.8 Since in the no-credit model qi  
P
k2Vi q
k
i  0,
A1+ and the lowerbound in AN imply that costs are convex since:
 u00i (qi) + u000i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i  ( u00i (qi) + u000i (qi)qi)I(u000i (qi) < 0)  0
Moreover since both indicator maps cannot hold at once either revenues are strictly con-
cave or costs are strictly convex. Thus assumptions A1+ and AN imply that the payo¤s
for each i are strictly concave and continuous. The strict concavity of individual payo¤
functions and the fact that for all q i, XNi (q
 i) is a non-empty, closed, bounded, convex
set imply that the best-response correspondences are single-valued. Continuity of the cor-
respondences XNi (q
 i) and continuity of the payo¤ functions imply (by Berges theorem of
the maximum) that the best response functions are continuous. Therefore the existence of
outow equilibrium is guaranteed by Brouwers xed point theorem.
Theorem 2 If assumption A1+ holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R+:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ i(q)=Vi; 2] (AL)
then an outow equilibrium exists both in the limited-credit and no-credit model.
Proof. Either credit assumption c 2 fN;Lg guarantees that the set of feasible outows
Xci (q
 i) is a continuous correspondence with non-empty, closed, bounded, convex, image
sets for every player i 2 V . Su¢ cient conditions for the best reply maps to be single-valued
are that player is revenues from the sales to market j 2 Vi be concave in qij, that his costs of
supplying units be convex in the vector of outows qi whenever revenues from selling units
to i are increasing. Indeed it is not necessary to discipline costs if revenues are decreasing
since such outows would never be a best reply for the suppliers of that individual.
To grant existence it su¢ ces to show A1+ and AL imply that E1 holds and that E2
holds whenever revenues are increasing. The concavity of revenues can be shown as in the
proof of 1, since either credit assumption still requires qi  qji  0, since A1+ still holds and
because the upperbound in AN coincides with that in AL. Asking revenues be increasing in
market i requires:
u0i(qi) + u
00
i (qi)q
j
i  0 ) u0i(qi)Vi + u00i (qi)
P
j2Vi q
j
i  0
8In particular I(A) =

1 if A is true
0 if A is false
.
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Moreover if such condition holds, A1+ and the lowerbound in AL imply that costs are convex
since:
 u00i (qi) + u000i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i  u0i(qi)Vi

 u
000
i (qi)
u00i (qi)
  u
00
i (qi)
u0i(qi)Vi

I(u000i (qi) < 0)  0
Again one of the two conditions on revenues and costs holds strictly. Thus assumptions
A1+ and AL imply that the payo¤s for each player are strictly concave and continuous
whenever increasing. The strict concavity of individual payo¤ functions implied by AL and
the fact that for all q i, Xci (q
 i) is a non-empty, closed, bounded, convex set imply that the
best-response correspondences are single-valued. Continuity of the correspondence Xci (q
 i)
and continuity of the payo¤ function imply (by Berges theorem of the maximum) that the
best response functions are continuous. Therefore the existence of outow equilibrium is
guaranteed by Brouwers xed point theorem.
Theorem 3 If assumption A1 holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ i(q)=Vi; 2i(q)] (AF)
then an outow equilibrium exists in anyone of the three credit models.
Proof. Either of the three credit assumptions c 2 fN;L; Fg guarantees that the set of
feasible outows Xci (q
 i) is a continuous correspondence with non-empty, closed, bounded,
convex, image sets for every player i 2 V . Su¢ cient conditions for the best reply maps to
be single-valued are that player is revenues from the sales to market j 2 Vi be concave
when increasing in qij, that his costs of supplying units be convex in the vector of outows
qi whenever revenues from selling units to i are increasing. Indeed it is not necessary to
discipline payo¤s if revenues are decreasing since such outows could never be a best reply
for players selling to i.
Assumptions A1 and AF imply that E1 and E2 hold, whenever revenues are increasing.
Because the lowerbound in AF coincides with that in AL, the convexity of costs can be
shown as in the proof of 2. Moreover if revenues increase u0i(qi) + u
00
i (qi)q
j
i  0, A1 and the
upperbound in AF imply that revenues are concave since:
2u00j (qj) + q
i
ju
000
j (qj)   u0i(qi)

u000i (qi)
u00i (qi)
  2u
00
i (qi)
u0i(qi)

I(u000j (qj) > 0)  0
Again one of the two conditions on revenues and costs holds strictly. Thus assumptions A1
and AF imply that the payo¤s for each player are strictly concave and continuous whenever
increasing. As in the previous theorem such observations su¢ ce to show that best reply
maps are continuous and single-valued. Therefore the existence of outow equilibrium is
again guaranteed by Brouwers xed point theorem.
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Basic Properties of the Outow Model
Proposition 6 If assumption A1 holds in any outow equilibrium q 2 RE+:
(a) Goods do not cycle and prices strictly increase along the supply chains
(b) Individuals with higher (lower) marginal utility than all their neighbors are sources
(sinks)
(c) Sources sell to all their neighbors with strictly higher marginal utility
(d) If i; j 2 Vk and u0i(qi) < u0j(qj), then i buys from k only if j buys from k
Proof. (a) Let T (q) = fij 2 Ejqij > 0g be the set of active trading links. If ij 2 T (q)
by rst order optimality it must be that u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj). If by way of contradiction a cycle
c = fij; jk; :::; lig 2 T (q), one gets a contradiction since:
u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj) < u
0
k(qk) < ::: < u
0
l(ql) < u
0
i(qi)
(b) If for i 2 V and for any j 2 Vi equilibrium dictates that u0i(qi)  u0j(qj), then i cannot
buy from any neighbor, since u0i(qi) > u
0
j(qj) is necessary for q
j
i > 0. Therefore his neighbors
prefer not to sell to him and qji = 0. Similarly when u
0
i(qk)  u0j(qj) for any j 2 Vi, player i
cannot be selling to any neighbor, since u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj) is necessary for q
i
j > 0.
(c) By part (b) if i is a source u00i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i = 0. Which in turn implies that, if A1 holds,
player i sells to any neighbor j 2 Vi with u0i(qi) < u0j(qj), since there always exists qij > 0
for which:
 u0i(qi) + u0j(qj) + qiju00j (qj) = 0
(d) If A1 holds, optimality of the trade from k to i requires:
u0k(qk)  u00k(qk)
P
l2Vk q
l
k = u
0
i(qi) + q
k
i u
00
i (qi) < u
0
i(qi)
Thus if the stated assumptions hold, it must be that:
u0k(qk)  u00k(qk)
P
l2Vk q
l
k < u
0
j(qj)
Which is both necessary and su¢ cient for a trade from k to j to occur.
Proposition 7 If assumption A1 holds and if u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj), then in any outow equilib-
rium of the complete networked economy: (1) qik  qjk and (2) qik > 0 implies qik > qjk.
Proof. The rst part of the proof shows that the marginal costs of supplying units of player
j exceed those of player i. Such claim is trivial if i 2 argmink2V u0k(qk), since by assumption
and by part (c) of proposition 6 marginal costs satisfy:
u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj)  u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)
P
l2Vj q
l
j
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If instead i =2 argmink2V u0k(qk), let Yi =

k 2 V jqki > 0
	
. Then notice that by parts (c)
and (d) of proposition 6 it must be that ; 6= Yi  Yj. By the optimality of trades from any
h 2 Yi to both i and j it must be that:
u0i(qi) + u
00
i (qi)q
h
i = u
0
j(qj) + u
00
j (qj)q
h
j
By adding such conditions for all h 2 Yi and some manipulation, one gets the desired
condition on marginal costs since:
u0j(qj) u00j (qj)
P
l2Vj q
l
j u0i(qi)+u00i (qi)
P
l2Vi q
l
i = (u
0
j(qj) u0i(qi))(jYij+1) u00j (qj)
P
l2YjnYi q
l
j > 0
Since the marginal costs of supplying units of player j exceed those of player i, if both
players sell a strictly positive amount of consumption to individual k, the marginal revenue
of player j must exceed that of player i:
u0k(qk) + u
00
k(qk)q
j
k > u
0
k(qk) + u
00
k(qk)q
i
k
Thus qik > q
j
k. If instead player i does not supply k, neither does j, since marginal costs
always exceed marginal revenues:
u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)
P
l2Vj q
l
j > u
0
i(qi) + u
00
i (qi)
P
l2Vi q
l
i > u
0
k(qk)
Proposition 8 If individuals do not discount and do not account for future actions, as the
number of instances in which to trade grows large the sequence of outow equilibrium trades
converges to the constrained e¢ cient outcome whenever such outcome is interior.
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows: rst it shows that the lowest marginal utility indi-
viduals at any iteration, always sell at the next iteration; then it shows that this requires
the sequence of equilibrium allocations to converge; nally it shows that such sequence has
to converge to the constrained e¢ cient outcome. It is without loss of generality to restrict
attention to connected networks, since separate components of the network will have no
inuence on each other. Let qij(t) denote the ow of goods from i to j at the t
th round of
trading, for t 2 f1; 2:::g. Consider an ine¢ cient round t 1 equilibrium outcome q(t 1) and
an individual i 2 argmini2V u0i(qi(t 1)). For any such player i it must be that qi(t 1) > 0
because the e¢ cient outcome being interior implies that:
qi(t  1) > qi > 0
Since i is a source at round t   1, he sells to all his neighbors with strictly higher mar-
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ginal utility by part (c) of proposition 6. Since the graph is connected there exists i 2
argmink2V u0k(qk(t  1)) and j 2 Vi such that:
u0i(qi(t  1)) < u0j(qj(t  1))
or else the outow equilibrium outcome would be e¢ cient. Therefore qij(t) > 0, since
i cannot have any inows at round t by proposition 6. Since the minimal equilibrium
marginal utility strictly increases at each iteration and is bounded above by u0i(q

i ), it must
converge. If minimal marginal utility converges to such upper-bound, the allocation is
e¢ cient in the limit since the marginal utility of all players in the economy converges.
However, if the sequence of minimal marginal utilities did not converge to such upper-bound,
a contradiction arises. In particular, suppose that limt!1mink2V u0k(qk(t 1)) < u0i(qi ) and
dene qi = limt!1 qi(t   1). If so, q cannot be a limiting outcome. Indeed if individuals
had an additional round to trade at q, they would have a incentives to do so, because again
i 2 argmink2V u0k(qk) and j 2 Vi such that u0i(qi) < u0j(qj) would exist. A contradiction.
Hence, it must be that:
limt!1mink2V u0k(qk(t  1)) = u0i(qi )
Marginal utilities of all players converge and limiting outcomes are constrained e¢ cient.
Large Economies and the Competitive Equilibrium
Lemma 9 An economy fG;Q;ug satises MC if and only if (T; e)  0 for any T  S if
and only if there exists q 2 RE+ such that:
ej +
P
i2Sj q
i
j = 0 for 8j 2 D (i)
ei  
P
j2Di q
i
j = 0 for 8i 2 S (ii)
Proof. The rst part of the proof shows that (H; e)  0 for any H  D if and only if
(H; e)  0 for any H  S. Suppose that (H; e)  0 for 8H  D. Notice that for any
T  S it must be that SnT  SDnDT . Therefore:
 (T; e) =  (S; e)  P
i2SnT
ei  
P
j2DnDT
ej =  
" P
j2DnDT
ej +
P
i2SDnDT
ei
#
  P
i2(SnT )nSDnDT
ei =
=  (DnDT ; e) 
P
i2Sn(T\SDnDT )
ei   (DnDT ; e)  0
Where the second equality holds since (S; e) = 0. The condition holds with equality if
Sn(T \ SDnDT ) = ; and (DnDT ; e) = 0. Similarly if (H; e)  0 for 8H  S, then
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DnT  DSnST for any T  D and:
(T; e) = (SnST ; e) 
P
j2Dn(T\DSnST )
ej  (SnST ; e)  0
The next part of the proof shows that condition MC is necessary for i and ii. Indeed suppose
that condition MC were violated at some T  D. So that (T;Q) < 0. Additionally assume
that condition ii holds. If so:
P
i2ST ei =
P
i2ST
P
j2Di q
i
j 
P
i2ST
P
j2T\Di q
i
j =
P
j2T
P
i2Sj q
i
j
But if such were the case, the following would hold:
0 > (T; e) =
P
i2ST ei +
P
j2T ej 
P
j2T
P
i2Sj q
i
j +
P
j2T ej
)  Pj2T ej >Pj2TPi2Sj qij
Which would imply the existence of a player i 2 D for which condition i fails.
To prove that MC is su¢ cient proceed by induction on D. Notice that if jDj = 1 the
theorem holds trivially because condition MC and feasibility imply that Sj = S for j 2 D.
Flows qij = ei for any 8i 2 S satisfy both conditions i and ii since
P
i2V ei = 0. Then suppose
that MC is su¢ cient whenever jDj  m   1 to prove that MC is su¢ cient for jDj = m.
Initially assume that there exists H  D such that (H; e) = 0. Consider the subgraph with
D0 = H, S 0 = SH and the edges restricted to those subsets E 0 = E \ fijji 2 S 0 \ j 2 D0g.
This subgraph satises condition MC trivially, since no condition was altered, but for the
fewer players. Thus by the induction assumption on H since jHj < m it is possible to nd
ows q 2 RE0+ such that conditions i and ii hold in the subgraph:
ej +
P
i2Sj q
i
j = 0 for 8j 2 H
ei  
P
j2Di\H q
i
j = 0 for 8i 2 SH
It remains to be shown that given such ows the remaining players of the original graph
still satisfy the conditions MC. Dene e0 the quantities adjusted for such ows and consider
the subgraph with D00 = DnH, S 00 = SnSH and E 00 = E\fijji 2 S 00 \ j 2 D00g. Notice that
for any K  DnH it must be that:
00(K; e0) = 00(K; e0) + 00(H; e0) Pi2SH\SK e0i =
= (K; e) Pi2SK Pj2Di\H qij + (H; e) Pi2SH\SK (ei  Pj2Di\H qij) =
= (K; e) + (H; e) Pi2SH\SK ei = (K [H; e)  0
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Since 00(H; e0) = (H; e) = 0 and
P
i2SH\SK e
0
i = 0. Which in turn implies by induction
that ows q0 2 RE00+ exist that satisfy condition i and ii, since jBnHj < m.
Finally if for any T  D we have that (T; e) > 0, consider H 2 argminTD (T; e).
Choose any prole of ows from SH to DnH such that:P
j2DnH
P
i2SH\Sj q
i
j = (H; e)
Notice that after such transfers condition MC holds in the economy:
(T; e0)  (T; e)  (H; e)  0
Moreover after such transfers the economy satises all the conditions required in the previous
proof of existence of ows satisfying i and ii, since (H; e0) = 0. Thus MC is su¢ cient.
Proposition 10 If a sequence of outow equilibria of replicas converges to the CE, then
equilibrium resale of any individual vanishes as the economy grows large.
Proof. Whenever the equilibrium of the replicas converges to the CE, it must be that
limz!1(pj(z)   pi(z)) = 0 for any two players i; j 2 V (z) for which limz!1 qi(z) > 0 and
limz!1 qj(z) > 0. Suppose by contradiction that for some player i 2 V (z):
limz!1 ri(z) = limz!1min
nP
k2Vi(z) q
k
i (z);
P
k2Vi(z) q
i
k(z)
o
> 0
Let i(z)  0 denote the multiplier on the non-negativity constraint of player i. If so, rst
order optimality for ows from i to his neighbors j 2 Vi(z) require:
limz!1(pj(z)  pi(z)) = limz!1

i(z)  u00i (qi(z))
P
k2Vi(z) q
k
i (z)  u00j (qj(z))qij

> 0
Which contradicts the assumption that the economy becomes competitive.
Theorem 11 Condition MC holds in an economy if and only if a sequence of outow equi-
libria of its replicas converges to the CE.
Proof. First the necessity of MC is proven. Notice that MC holds in an economy if and
only if MC holds in any of its replicas. If MC were not hold, by lemma 9 no direct ows
would exist from competitive sellers to competitive buyers that support the CE allocation
in the original economy. Thus resale is necessary for the competitive equilibrium allocation
to be an outcome of such economy. Dene the minimal competitive resale in the z-replica
economy as:
r(z) = min
q2RE(z)+
maxi2V (z) ri(z) s.t. (i) and (ii)
Notice that MC fails if and only if r(1) > 0. Moreover the denition of replica requires
r(1) = r(z), because minimizing the maximum requires players of the same type to resell
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the identical amounts and because taking averages across players of each type competitive
ows of the original economy obtain with r(1) = r(z). Thus any prole of ows leading to
the CE allocation would require at least one player to resell a positive amount of goods even
in the limit economy. But, by proposition 10 no such outcome could be a limiting outow
equilibrium since no resale can take place in competitive limit economies.
The next part of the proof shows that MC is su¢ cient for the existence of a competitive
limit economy In particular consider ows in the original economy q 2 RE+ satisfying (i) and
(ii). Such ow exist because MC holds. Then dene the sequence of ows q(z) 2 RE(z)+ as
follows: qi:sj:t(z) = q
i
j=z for any (i:s)(j:t) 2 E(z). Such ows are direct and satisfy conditions
(i) and (ii) for the replica z. Moreover limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0. Thus limz!1 q(z) satises all
the conditions for an outow equilibrium in the limit economy. In particular, if such are
ows chosen by others, no player will be able to sell goods at a price above the CE value,
since deviations on his part can only reduce prices in the limit as limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0. Since
gains from deviating from q(z) decrease along the sequence of replicas and vanish in the
limit, the limit of q(z) is competitive and belongs to the limit of the outow equilibrium
correspondence.
Proposition 12 If assumption A1 holds and if:
(1) u000i  0, then a symmetric outow equilibrium exists in the limit economy
(2) MC holds, then a competitive outow equilibrium exist in the limit economy
(3) Vi  S for any i 2 D, then a unique outow equilibrium exist in the limit economy
Proof. (1) Since in any symmetric equilibrium of the limiting economy the outow wedges
vanish. Revenues in each market are concave. Since the third derivative is positive costs
of supplying units are convex. Therefore existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the limit
economy follows just as in theorem 3.
(2) This is a consequence of the price distortion vanishing any limiting competitive
economy (which requires concave revenues and convex costs) and of theorem 11 (which
shows that MC implies that a limiting outcome is competitive).
(3) First notice that for any sequence of outow equilibrium ow q(z) 2 RE(z)+ it must be
that mini:s2V (z) u0i:s(qi:s(z)) 2 S. Because such a player does not purchase consumption by
part (c) of proposition 6 and because by denition of competitive equilibrium qi:s(z)  qi ,
player i cannot belong to D as some player in S would have sold units to him. Since Vj  S
for any j 2 D implies Vj  D for any j 2 S, player i 2 S would sell a positive amount
of consumption to all his neighbors Vi  D with strictly higher marginal utility than him.
By contradiction suppose that there exists a sequence of outow equilibria that does not
converge to the competitive equilibrium. If so there exists a player whose marginal utility
does not converge to the competitive value. Let V+(z) = fk 2 V (z)jqk(z) > 0g and let i:s
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be the player for which:
 
u0i:s(qi:s(z))  u0j:t(qj:t(z))
  0 for 8j:t 2 V+(z)
Since Vk  S for any k 2 D implies Vk  D for any k 2 S, player i:s 2 S(z) would
sell a positive amount of consumption to all his neighbors Vi(z)  D(z) with strictly higher
marginal utility than him. Because limz!1 jD(z)j = limz!1 z jDj =1 and because D(z) 
V+(z) \ Vi:s(z), the number of players connected to i:s with equilibrium marginal utility
strictly higher than i:s diverges to innity, limz!1 jV+(z) \ Vi:s(z)j =1. If player i:s were
a source, he would be selling a positive amount of consumption to all linked players with
strictly higher marginal utility by part (c) of proposition 6. In fact for a limiting outow
equilibrium not to be competitive, requires that for any j:t 2 limz!1D(z):
limz!1
 
u0i:s(qi:s(z))  u0j:t(qj:t(z))

< 0
Which requires i:s to sells a positive amount of goods to all those players in equilibrium as
z grows large and thus limz!1
 
qi:sj:t(z)

> 0. But this gives rise to a contradiction, since
limz!1 (qi:s(z)) > 0 and Qi < 1 imply that by assumption no player can sell a positive
amount of goods to innitely many players. It remains to be shown that the amount of
goods resold by player i:s has to vanish to apply proposition 6 in the limit and complete
the proof. If for no player limz!1 (qj:t(z)) = 0 the result holds immediately, since only such
players can sell to i:s. Thus suppose that V (z)nV+(z) is non-empty in the limit. Let k:l be
the player for which:
 
u0k:l(qk:l(z))  u0j:t(qj:t(z))
  0 for 8j:t 2 V (z)
Players in V (z)nV+(z) sell to i:s only if k:l sells to i:s, since their opportunity cost is higher.
But if k:l sells to i:s, then by part (c) of proposition 6 k:l sells also to all players with lower
marginal utility. Because limz!1 jV+(z) \ Vk:l(z)j =1 and because k:l benets from selling
to all players in V+(z) \ Vk:l(z), it must that the amount he sells to all, but nitely many
players must vanish. In particular since innitely may players have higher marginal utility
than i:s it must be that limz!1 qk:li:s (z) = 0
+. Necessary conditions for optimality along the
sequence would require that, since for any j:t 2 Vk:l(z) with marginal utility bigger than i:s:
u0k:l(qk:l(r)) + k:l < u
0
i:s(qi:s(z)) < u
0
j:t(qj:t(z))
which implies that the limit economy satises for all, but nitely many j:t 2 Vk:l(z), including
i:s:
limz!1 u0k:l(qk:l(z)) + k:l = limz!1 u
0
i:s(qi:s(z)) = limz!1 u
0
j:t(qj:t(z))
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But since resale occurs only at positive markups this implies that in the limit i:s would
sell only to nitely many players unless limz!1Ri:s(z) = 0. Moreover because innitely
players have similar incentives to sell to the nitely many players buying goods at positive
markups in the limit economy, such players do not exist. Thus, since limz!1Ri:s(z) = 0 no
equilibrium that is not competitive can ever exist in the limit.
Proposition 13 If conditions for existence are met and if in any z-replica there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium, then symmetric equilibrium per-capita social welfare increases
every time the economy is replicated.
Proof. Dene the total quantity sold from an individual of type i to all individuals of type
j in the symmetric equilibrium of an z-replica economy by qij(z) = zq
i
j(z). The inequali-
ties dening the symmetric equilibrium of a z-replica (a complementarity problem) can be
written in terms of such quantities (omitting the dependence on z):
f ij(q;jz) =  u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)(qij=z) + u0i(qi)  u00i (qi)
Pk
k2Vi q
k
i + i  0
fi(q;jz) = qi  0
Notice that in such system of equations the replica counter z appears only once. Moreover
for z = 1 such conditions require optimality in the original economy. By assumption any
replica economy possesses a unique equilibrium and conditions for existence are met. The
complementarity problem has a unique solution only if the Jacobian of that problem is
positive denite at the unique symmetric equilibrium (see [12]):
JT (q;jz) = rT (z)f(q;jz) > 0
where only the principal minor of Jacobian associated the active indices is considered. The
indices active in the z-replica are dened by:
T (q;jz) = ij2Ejqij(z) > 0	 [ fi 2 V ji(z) > 0g
By the implicit function theorem it must be that at the unique equilibrium of the z-replica:
@f
@q
@q
@z
+
@f
@
@
@z
+
@f
@z
= 0 ) @(q;)
@z
=  JT (q;jz) 1@f
@z
Moreover by the denition of the complementarity problem it must be that:
@f ij(q;jz)
@z
=
u00j (qj)q
i
j
z2
and
@fi(q;jz)
@z
= 0
For notational convenience label players so that in the unique outow equilibrium of the
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original economy q1  q2  :::  qV . Also dene x =

u00j (qj)q
i
j
	
ij2E and Z =

zijkl
	
ij;kl2E
for:
zijkl =
8><>:
1=z if ij = kl
1 if j = k \ qij > 0
0 if otherwise
For such notation and letting E(qjz) = ij2Ejqij(z) > 0	, one gets that:
Zx =

u00j (qj)(q
i
j=z) + u
00
i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i
	
ij2E
@q
@z
=  (1=z2)JE(q;jz) 1x
Where JE(q;jz) 1 is the leading minor of JT (q;jz) 1 associated with indexes in E(qjz).
The matrix Z is positive denite, since for an appropriate ordering of links it is lower
triangular and because all elements on the main diagonal are positive. The matrix can be
arranged in a triangular fashion for any prole of equilibrium ows, because goods do not
cycle in the economy. Di¤erentiating per-capita social welfare with respect to z one gets
that:
@W (q)
@z
=
@
@z

1
V
P
i2V ui(qi)

=
1
V
P
ij2E(@q
i
j=@z)(u
0
j(qj)  u0i(qi)) =
=  (1=V )Pij2E(@qij=@z)  u00j (qj)qij + u00i (qi)Pk2Vi qki  =
=   1
V
x0Z 0
@q
@z
=
1
V z2
x0Z 0JE(q;jz) 1x  0
The last expression is positive since it is a bilinear form and because both Z 0 and JE(q;jz)
are positive denite. In fact because both are positive denite, consider the positive def-
inite square root H of JE(q;jz) 1 (i.e. JE(q;jz)HH = I) then Z 0JE(q;jz) 1 =
H 1(HZ 0H)H. Therefore Z 0JE(q;jz) 1 and HZ 0H have the same eigenvalues. Since
HZ 0H = H 0Z 0H, such matrix is positive denite and thus has only non-negative eigenval-
ues. The third equality uses the observation that @qij=@z 6= 0 implies that the rst order
condition holds with equality at the original allocation. If in fact @qij=@z < 0 then qi > 0,
but (z   1)qij(z   1) > 0 also implies qij = zqij(z) > 0. If @qij=@z > 0 then qij > 0 and rst
order conditions hold at z as well since (z   1)qi(z   1) < 0.
7 Appendix B: Further Results
7.1 More on Existence & Uniqueness
Non-di¤erentiable negative orthant...
41
Flow Competition in Networked Markets Nava
7.2 More on Complete Networks
This section provides completes the characterization of the outow equilibrium trades for
economies in which all individuals are connected. Proposition 7 did show that in such
economies low marginal utility players to sell more. However, if all players have a common
utility function u and if such utility function satises assumptions that are su¢ cient for
equilibrium existence, stronger results can be derived. Specically assume that:
Assumption A2 For any player i 2 V assume that ui = u and that:
 qu000(q)=u00(q) 2 [0; (q)]
Assumption A2 is satised if u is by any CARA utility function. When A2 holds the
completeness of the network guarantees that inows can be ranked across players.
Proposition 15 If assumptions A1 and A2 hold in any outow equilibrium of the complete
networked economy Qi > Qj if and only if qi > qj if and only if:
(1) qik  qjk and qik > 0 implies qik > qjk
(2) qki  qkj and qkj > 0 implies qki < qkj
(3) qij  qji and qij > 0 implies qji = 0
Whenever the assumptions A1 and A2 hold, individuals consuming more goods buy less from
their neighbors and sell more to their neighbors when compared to individuals consuming
less. The additional assumptions on the utility function were required to motivate any
individual to sell more goods to those local markets in which the demand is steeper. Since
those consuming more buy less and sell more, it must be that they started with more
endowment. Thus if assumption A2 holds in any outow equilibrium of the complete network
economy an individual consumes more goods if and only if he starts with more goods. When
A1 and A2 hold and the network is complete, the ow pattern is completely pinned down
by the endowments alone. By proposition 6 it must be that the individuals with biggest
endowment never buy, while individuals with the smallest endowment never sell.
7.3 More on Inow Competition
The rst order condition for the inow model written only in terms of utility functions states
that:
u0i(qi)  u0j(qj) + u00j (qj)qji + u00i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
i
k  0
The following credit constraints respectivey dened as full, limited and no-credit can be
used to guarantee existence of inow equilibria.
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XFi (q i) =

qi 2 RVi+
 qj  0 if j 2 Vi	 (FI)
XLi (q i) =

qi 2 RVi+
 qj  qji if j 2 Vi	 (LI)
XNi (q i) =
n
qi 2 RVi+
 qj Pk2Vj qjk if j 2 Vio (NI)
In particular, in addititon to theorem 14, the following conditions are su¢ cient for the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium of the inow model.
Theorem 16 If assumption A1+ holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R+:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ 2; 1] (ANI)
then an outow equilibrium exists both in the limited-credit and no-credit model.
Theorem 17 If assumption A1+ holds and if for any player i 2 V and q 2 R+:
 qu000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ 2i(q); 1] (ALI)
then an outow equilibrium exists both in the limited-credit and no-credit model.
The remaining results for the inow model coincide with those results proven in the
outow model. Price distortions in the two models di¤er, but their implications on com-
petition, ows and markups will be similar. The major di¤erences between the two model
are due to the fact that sellers, rather that buyers, own the trading locations in the inow
setup. Such property right will in general lead more rents to ow to buyers, because of their
ability to commit to their purchases.
7.4 Inow Competition Examples
Again consider an economy with three players fa; b; cg and with endowments f2; 1; 0g. All
players have a common utility map u(q) = q1=2. If only a and c were allowed to trade, 0:75
units would be exchanged between them at a price of 0:45. More goods are traded at a lower
price in the inow equilibrium of this economy than in the outow equilibrium discussed in
section 2.6. Social welfare in the inow model exceeds that of the outow outcome.
If the link between players a and b were added, the inow equilibrium social welfare would
drop. As was the case for the outow model, such change curtails the ow of consumption to
the least endowed consumer. In this economy the player a sells 0:71 and 0:1 units respectively
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a
b c
2
01
2
01
a
b c
2
01
a
b c
.75 .71 .63.1 .12
.17
Figure 1: Figure 7: On the vertices of a network endowments and identities and on the
edges ows.
to players c and b at a price per unit of 0:46. Such change in ows negatively a¤ects the player
with the highest demand for consumption and therefore reduces equilibrium social welfare.
Again the inow economy outperforms the outow outcome, since rents are appropriated
by buyers rather than suppliers.
E1 p q w E2 p q w E3 p q w
1 0.45 1.25 1.45 1 0.46 1.19 1.46 1 0.45 1.25 1.45
2 - 1.00 1.00 2 - 1.10 1.00 2 0.51 0.95 1.01
3 - 0.75 0.54 3 - 0.71 0.52 3 - 0.80 0.53
+ - 3.00 2.99 + - 3.00 2.98 + - 3.00 2.99
Table 4: Prices received, consumption and welfare. Left facg, center fac; abg, right
fac; ab; bcg.
Finally consider the fully connected network. In the inow equilibrium of this economy
two prices reign. The player a sells to both players at a price of 0:45. Player b sells to
c at a price of 0:51 all the units purchased from a plus some of his own. All trades take
place in equilibrium and it is in the best interest of player c to buy from both suppliers
at di¤erent prices. Though equilibrium ows are signicant, social welfare in the economy
is still ine¢ cient. The inow economy still outperforms the outow economy in terms of
e¢ ciency. Table 4 and gure 7 report inow equilibrium prices, ows and allocations for
the three examples.
7.5 Large Markets Without Replica
A sequence of networked economies fG(z);Q(z);u(z)gz2N is said to increase if for any z 2 N
and i 2 V (z):
(1) V (z)  V (z + 1) & E(z)  E(z + 1)
(2) Qi(z) = Qi & ui(z) = ui
The rst conditions states that the number of players and connections grows. The second
states that players tastes and endowments do not depend on the market structure. LetD(z)
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denote the set of individuals buying goods in the competitive equilibrium q(z) 2 RV (z)+ of
the z-th economy and let S(z) denote the set of players selling goods:
D(z) = fi 2 V jQi < qi (z)g
S(z) = fi 2 V jQi > qi (z)g
Denition 1 An networked economy becomes competitive, if a selection of the outow equi-
librium correspondence converges to the CE.
Given such denitions it is possible to state the following two results about competition in
large markets:
Proposition 18 Consider an increasing sequence of economies if the economy becomes
competitive, then outow equilibrium resale by any individual vanishes.
Theorem 19 Consider an increasing sequence of economies if 9Z 2 N such that condition
MC holds in any economy z > Z and if limz!1 jDi(z)j = limz!1 jSj(z)j = 1 for any
i 2 D(z) and j 2 S(z), then the networked economy becomes competitive.
Proposition 20 Consider an increasing sequence of economies if 9Z 2 N such that Vi(z) 
S(z) for any i 2 D(z) and z > Z and if limz!1 jD(z)j = 1, then any equilibrium of the
networked economy becomes competitive.
As for replica economies no goods can be resold in a competitive economy, since resale
occurs only at positive markups. As the number of competitive buyers and sellers grows
large and if all buyers meet all sellers the networked economy becomes competitive. In fact
if all direct trades are available, retailers get squeezed out of the market, since the rents
from selling become arbitrarily small.
7.6 Web-Appendix Proofs
The Complete Network Economy
Proposition 15 If A1 and A2 hold in any pure strategy equilibrium of the complete net-
worked economy Qi > Qj if and only if qi > qj if and only if
(1) qik  qjk and qik > 0 implies qik > qjk
(2) qki  qkj and qkj > 0 implies qki < qkj
(3) qij  qji and qij > 0 implies qji = 0
Proof. First we show that qi > qj implies (1), (2) and (3). Conditions (1) and (3) follow
directly from proposition 6 and 7 given that assumption A2 implies that qi > qj if and only
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if u0(qi) < u0(qj). The proof of condition (2) instead relies heavily on the symmetry implicit
in A2. If qkj > 0 and q
k
i = 0 the claim is trivial. Also recall that by proposition 6 if q
k
j = 0
then qki = 0. So suppose that both are positive, q
k
j > 0 and q
k
i > 0. Then by optimality for
the two trades it must be that:
u0(qk)  u00(qk)
P
l2Vk q
l
k = u
0(qi) + qki u
00(qi) = u0(qj) + qkj u
00(qj)  0
) qki   qkj =
 
(u00i u
0
j   u0iu00j ) + (u0k   u00k
P
l2Vk q
l
k)(u
00
j   u00i )

=u00i u
00
j (3)
Thus rewriting and the two equalities one gets that:Notice that the denominator is always
positive. The second term in the numerator is negative since qj < qi implies u00(qj) < u00(qi)
by u000 > 0. The rst term is also negative since assumption A2 and qj < qi imply:
 u00(qj)=u0(qj)   u00(qi)=u0(qi) , u00(qi)u0(qj)  u0(qi)u00(qj)  0
Now we prove that (1), (2) and (3) imply qi > qj. First suppose that qi; qj < qk = maxl ql.
Then since both i and j buy from k condition 3 needs to hold. Since assumption it must be
that qki   qkj < 0 it must be that: 
(u00i u
0
j   u0iu00j ) + (u0k   u00k
P
l2Vk q
l
k)(u
00
j   u00i )

=u00i u
00
j < 0 (4)
But notice that assumptions A1 and A2 require that:
u00(qj) > u00(qi) , qj < qi , u0(qi)u00(qj)  u00(qi)u0(qj) < 0
Therefore since the denominator of 4 is positive and since both terms in the numerator have
the same sign, they must both be negative which implies qj < qi.
Thus consider the case in which maxfqi; qjg = maxl ql > minfqi; qjg. If qj > qi, then
proposition 6 would require qji > 0 which would contradict condition (3). Finally if qi =
qj = maxl ql, then qik > 0 implies q
i
k = q
j
k, since by proposition 6 both trade with k and:
u0(qi) = u0(qk) + qiku
00(qk) = u0(qj) = u0(qk) + q
j
ku
00(qk)
) qik   qjk = (u0(qi)  u0(qj)) =u00(qk) = 0
Which contradicts condition (1). Thus A2 and conditions (1), (2), (3) imply qi > qj.
Now we show that qi > qj implies Qi > Qj. If qi > qj in equilibrium then conditions (1)-
(3) holds. Condition (1) and the network being complete imply that
P
k2Vi q
i
k >
P
k2Vj q
j
k.
While condition (2) requires that
P
k2Vj q
k
j >
P
k2Vi q
k
i . Thus one gets that:
Qi  Qj =
P
k2Vi q
i
k  
P
k2Vj q
j
k

+
P
k2Vj q
k
j  
P
k2Vi q
k
i

> 0
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To prove the converse notice that if Qi > Qj and qi  qj then condition (1) impliesP
k2Vi q
i
k 
P
k2Vj q
j
k and condition (2) implies
P
k2Vj q
k
j 
P
k2Vi q
k
i . Thus:
Qi  Qj =
P
k2Vi q
i
k  
P
k2Vj q
j
k

+
P
k2Vj q
k
j  
P
k2Vi q
k
i

< 0
A contradiction.
Large Markets Without Replica
Proposition 18 Consider an increasing sequence of economies if the economy becomes
competitive, then outow equilibrium resale by any individual vanishes.
Proof. The proof of proposition 10 made no reference to replicas and thus applies to
arbitrary sequences of economies.
Theorem 19 Consider an increasing sequence of economies if 9Z 2 N such that condition
MC holds in any economy z > Z, then an outow equilibrium becomes competitive.
Proposition 20 Consider an increasing sequence of economies if 9Z 2 N such that Vi(z) 
S(z) for any i 2 D(z) and z > Z and if limz!1 jD(z)j = 1, then any outow equilibrium
becomes competitive.
Proof. Existence of a competitive outow equilibrium is implied because MC holds. The
proof of uniqueness in part (3) of proposition 6 does not rely on the denition of replica and
thus the same argument applies.
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